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The article deals with the «minimal configuration» of social institutions that ensure sustainable development not by adapting to the environment (the adaptive behaviour charac­
teristic of traditional societies), but through uninterrupted generation and implementa­
tion of innovations that transform environment to meet the changing needs of human­
kind. This type of active adaptive behaviour characteristic of modern society could not be 
maintained in the absence of three basic «metainstitutions» of modernity, viz. 1) science,
2) the banking and exchange system, 3) institutions of representative democracy (parliaments), plus 
three «support institutions»: 4) free press (mass media), 5) rational bureaucracy, 6) independent ju­
diciary.
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АН Н О Т А Ц И Я
В статье рассматривается «минимальная конфигурация» социальных институтов, обеспечивающих устойчивое развитие не путем приспособления к «окружающей среде» (тип адаптации, характер­
ный для «традиционных» обществ»), а посредством непрерывной генерации и внедрения иннова­
ций, меняющих «окружающую среду» соответственно нуждам и запросам общества. Этот тип актив­
ной адаптации, характерный для «современного» общества, был бы невозможен без трех базисных 
метаинститутов современности: 1) академической науки, 2) банковско-биржевой системы; 3) пред­
ставительных законодательных институтов и трех «институтов поддержки»: 4) свободной прессы, 
5) рациональной бюрократии, 6) независимого суда.
Клю ч ев ы е слова: инновации; метаинституты; современное общество; наука.
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Basically, being an international event, the 
Peace of Westphalia is also interesting as a 
marking point in Europe’s social and cultural 
history. It introduced or reestablished a number 
of practices that were to prove crucial to the de­
velopment of modern society. It provided for re­
ligious toleration in Germany and, more impor­
tant perhaps, confirmed the United Provinces of 
the Netherlands and the Swiss Confederation in 
their capacity as independent modern-type re­
publics. In this, as well as in its other provisions, 
it marked the shift of historic initiative from the 
Mediterranean to other countries (the Nordic et 
alia), where modern society was being forged. 
If not the birthday, it can thus be viewed as, at 
least, the day of confirmation of modernity. But 
it also marked a cultural rift between European 
nations, it would take a centuries-long and ardu­
ous effort of modernisation to heal.
From “Natural Selection” to Active Adapta­
tion. A question to be asked about modernity is 
why this kind of social order, despite its appar­
ent advantages and often irresistible appeal, is 
so difficult to borrow or, for that matter, to im­
pose? The usual, almost “natural” answer is that 
transition to modernity is a response to a set of 
challenges that is open only to societies that have 
reached a certain phase of development. The ex­
planation is however wanting on, at least, one 
crucial point: societies at the same -  presuma­
bly, technological -  phase of development are 
known to respond to similar challenges in dif­
ferent ways. The obvious conclusion is the pro­
cess in question does not follow a clear-cut line 
of development. It is seductively easy to theorise 
in terms of phases that every society will have 
to pass sooner or later; it is much more difficult 
to substantiate this kind of theory. There is no 
reason to believe that all societies will end at the 
same place after having passed the same route. 
In fact, social development is remarkably anal­
ogous in this respect to the biological evolution: 
a wolf may be good, a crocodile, perhaps, even 
superb, in their own niches, but this does not 
mean they are steps to a human being. In a simi­
lar way, a community may discover its own niche 
and drag on without visible changes simply be­
cause no one seeks to oust it. Admittedly, social 
life is characterised by the scarcity, not to say -  
virtual absence of unoccupied niches. In this, it 
is different from natural life and its challenges 
prove more imperative.
If this general (evolutionist) approach is ac­
cepted, the viability (survivability) of societies 
appears in the following perspective. Roughly 
speaking, the evolutionist theory knows two ad­
aptation strategies: either “narrow” specialisa­
tion (securing dominance in a specific niche), or 
development of a “universal” mechanism that 
would enable an organism to analyse the chang­
ing environment and facilitate the species’ ex­
pansion to other niches. The latter function is 
performed by the brain, which is of use, to be 
sure, in isolated niches, but becomes much more 
important with the development of technology. 
To pursue the metaphor, good clothes make all 
weathers good!
If we review the historic process from this 
evolutionist perspective, we shall come across 
a great number of stagnant societies that fail to 
generate their own, internal resources for de­
velopment and may be viewed as analogues of 
vegetable or animal species that have got control 
over their own niches and exist in equilibrium 
with their environment, but are doomed to per­
ish when the resources supplied by that environ­
ment are exhausted. And we shall find out only 
one type of social order that has proved to ex­
pand into all possible niches and shows no signs 
of stagnation, but is, on the contrary, character­
ised by sustainable development [10]. This soci­
ety, usually referred to as modern, dates back, at 
least, to the Age of Discoveries.
Our principal argument here is as follows. 
Just like the development of the brain is the be­
ginning of a process that eventually replaces so­
matic changes as a principal means of adaptation 
for a selected species of living beings by techno­
logical development, so the emergence of a so­
cial order that would enable societies to live and 
expand by adapting environment rather than by 
adapting to environment is a radical, absolutely 
radical, change that likewise terminates “natu­
ral selection” in the social sphere. Unlike earlier, 
“traditional” societies, “modern” societies re­
spond to challenges not so much by reshaping 
themselves, as by reshaping their environment,
i.e. in a way that is characteristic of human ad­
aptation. But just like humans cannot help being 
affected by this and must, at least, learn to live 
with the kind of stress that goes with the lifestyle 
in question, so do the societies.
Modernity is not immune to criticism, and 
this type of criticism is an important part of the
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modern political discourse. The irony of this 
criticism is that when it comes to modernity tra­
ditionalists and postmodernists are sometimes 
extremely difficult to distinguish between (com­
pare Konstantin Leontiev to Herbert Marcuse, 
for instance) [5]. The message of ecologists is 
that by destroying environment technological­
ly the civilisation digs its own grave [9]. But is 
this not what man has been doing for millen­
nia? Most deserts on earth owe their existence 
to human activities. Not only in modern times, 
man has always changed its environment, pro­
voking new challenges. This is a law of techno­
logical adaptation. It would be irresponsible to 
ignore the problem, of course, but from Russian 
Slavophil philosophers of the nineteenth centu­
ry and Oswald Spengler to Herbert Marcuse and 
the Roman Club theorists, all critics of moderni­
ty follow the same line of argument: the threat­
ening trends are extended to infinity, while the 
principal feature of modern societies -  their 
innovative potential that helps solve the prob­
lems -  is ignored.
In the meantime, the very idea, the core of 
modernity is to solve problems generated by 
technological development by means of further 
technological development. Innovations are 
innovations precisely because they cannot be 
“calculated” in advance (cf. Karl Popper [8]). 
Incidentally, this is why criticism of modernity 
appears plausible (at least, many have found it 
convincing), but in real life, problems turn out 
to be solved: we witness industries to disappear 
and new industries to emerge.
The situation can only be explained if we ad­
mit that, starting from a certain minimal level of 
institutional complexity, societies are no longer 
destroyed by unanticipated challenges, but learn 
to respond to them adequately.
The question is what is the minimal level of 
institutional complexity or, to be more specific, 
what is the configuration of institutions that en­
ables societies to give an innovative response to 
virtually any challenge? If this question can be 
answered, the classification of societies (civilisa­
tions) into those that are capable of sustainable 
development and those that are not is no longer 
a display of arrogance, of Euro- (or for that mat­
ter, some other) centrism, but an intelligent 
point of distinguishing between two types of 
social adaptation and survival. From this stand­
point, stagnant societies that do not maintain a
regular flow of innovations share the fate of liv­
ing species adapted to a specific niche: their sur­
vival is a matter of luck, viz. whether this niche is 
sought by a better adapted rival or not.
The principal difference between natural and 
social history, however, lies in the fact that once 
a society capable of sustainable development has 
emerged, it cannot help upsetting the equilibri­
um of eventually all other societies -  by its very 
existence, by the continuous flow of innovations 
that create new problems to be solved by further 
innovations, in short -  by destroying other soci­
eties’ specific niches simply because the Earth is 
too small and no social niches are truly isolated.
Needless to say, the process is painful, for all 
other societies, for all their distinctive achieve­
ments, are faced with, in fact -  are forced to face 
a hard, often uninspiring dilemma: either to lose 
their identity and modernise or to disappear. To 
“disappear” does not necessarily mean to literally 
“die out” (the “human matter” can be preserved at 
the expense of social structures), but extinction is 
not excluded and is sometimes quite probable -  as 
a number of small, “too” traditional societies have 
all but learnt from their own experience.
To come back to the “minimal configuration” 
of social institutions that “starts up” modernity 
one has to revise the institutional developments 
of the areas where modernity originated at the 
time of its origins. What institutions were known 
to the countries in question, what was lacking 
and had to be created?
It is not difficult to discern in Northern Eu­
rope of the seventeenth century the unique si­
multaneous existence (in some cases, first ap­
pearance) of social institutions that are charac­
teristic of modernity, but unknown to the tra­
ditional societies. These include (1) the parlia­
ment, (2) rational bureaucracy, (3) independent 
judiciary, (4) academic science, (5) financial in­
stitutions, (6) mass production, (7) mass media 
(book-printing) [1; 7].
On their own, these or similar institutions 
could exist and in fact existed earlier in other 
societies (parliaments, for example, date back 
to High Middle Ages, rational bureaucracy is a 
well-known Chinese phenomenon [see 2]), but 
did not produce similar consequences. Our prin­
cipal hypothesis is that of critical importance 
was their simultaneous existence, i.e. their inter­
action, or rather self-support. This self-support 
is our next theme.
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The “Backbone” of Modernity. Let us now 
pursue the metaphor and consider the system of 
social institutions as the social analogue of the 
brain or, to put it more adequately, as the socie­
ty’s institutionalised mind.
Like everything else that exists in the world as 
a part of it, societies must interact with their en­
vironment; and like everything else that interact 
with the environment, they require certain func­
tional organs. They need organs that could “see” 
and “apprise” the situation; let us call them “the 
eyes”. They need organs that could “interpret” 
the situation. They need a set of rules guiding, 
or rather triggering behaviour; let us call them 
“the instincts”. They need “effectors” that could 
change the environment or else move from the 
unfavourable environment to a favourable one. 
And they need resources of energy and, last but 
not least, a mechanism that would help them as­
sess how (for what purposes and to what extent) 
these resources must/may be spent.
Primitive societies (like lower animals) may 
manage with rigid behaviour traits and rigid 
“judgement” rules, but more sophisticated sys­
tems would require special organs and mecha­
nisms that could adapt the “rules of behaviour” 
and “value systems” to the environment or -  in 
still more “advanced” cases -  to the desired en­
vironment [3].
Once developed, such mechanisms would es­
sentially function like “metaprograms”, transcend­
ing the immediate task of “supporting life”. It is, 
therefore, obvious that the transition from the sim­
plest -  responding -  mechanism to a mechanism 
supporting deliberate adaptation of the environ­
ment is a structural leap that involves develop­
ment of “metaprograms”. In the case of the brain 
we think we understand how this shift to a pur­
poseful active adaptation was achieved -  by the de­
velopment of new sections of the brain, viz. cortex 
(which is bigger in size than all its other sections 
taken together) -  and know when it took place.
The leap thus implies the development of a 
new organ: such a change in behaviour patterns 
would be impossible unless supported instru­
mentally. There is no reason to believe a similar 
transition in social life can be achieved without 
an appropriate instrumental support: “metap­
rograms” must apparently be realised in the 
form of new, hitherto unknown institutions. And 
these new institutions would have to account for 
a considerable part of the society in question: a
couple of clever heads would obviously not suf­
fice.
If we now turn to modernity and summarise 
the changes that distinguish modern societies 
from their predecessors, we shall at once come 
across these “metainstitutions”, i. e. the institu­
tions that fulfil the function of “metaprograms”: 
parliaments whose basic task is to set the “rules 
of the game” depending on the changing envi­
ronment (situation); science that is supposed 
to generate innovations (including ideas of new 
“rules”); and economic institutions (the banking 
and exchange system) that regulate the resourc­
es on the basis of principles that go beyond the 
immediate needs. From this standpoint, profit is 
a metaprinciple because profit does not satisfy 
any “immediate needs”; once the profit mecha­
nism is on, a totally different process begins. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that it is precisely this 
principle of profit that traditionalists renounce 
as the primary evil of modern times. And it is 
likewise no coincidence that the two other prin­
cipal objects of traditionalist criticism happen to 
be representative democracy and science.
What is important here is the systemic aspect 
of modernity. If a society that seeks modernisa­
tion introduces -  for whatever reason -  the basic 
institutions of modernity only partially or for­
mally (by this we mean that institutions may be 
established but the basic principles of their oper­
ation are rejected), the attempt at modernisation 
is doomed to fail [6, p. 4.].
For the principles of modernity are not hu­
man principles. They transcend human under­
standing and human interests -  in so far as by 
“human understanding” and “human interests” 
we mean the understanding and the interests of 
an individual human being. For this reason, it 
is so easy to criticise them -  and so unreward­
ing. For it is precisely because they are “super­
human”, because they activate mechanisms that 
transcend immediate human needs and, more­
over, appear sometimes to violate certain basic 
rules worked out at the previous stages of devel­
opment, they constitute a breakthrough to a new 
stage of development, viz. modernity.
But they form a system that must operate as 
a system, that is as a set of interacting and mu­
tually supporting elements. It would be useless 
to try to introduce the profit mechanisms in a 
society that has not developed institutions ca­
pable of originating and applying innovations. If
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the principles of science are not recognised and 
supported by the appropriate institutions, the 
profit principle will produce nothing but usury. 
It would be likewise useless to introduce repre­
sentative democracy if economic priorities can­
not be assessed by the bodies that operate inde­
pendently from the (presumably democratic) in­
stitutions of power. You will only get corruption.
We may thus identify three basic “metainsti­
tutions” of modernity, viz. parliaments, science 
and financial system, that are supported and 
served by the rational bureaucracy, independent 
judiciary and mass media. The functions of the 
latter three are as follows:
(1) Rational bureaucracy operates as an effec­
tor. With this, it differs from particularistic bu­
reaucracy: unlike the latter, it has no interests of 
its own and simply does what it has to do; other­
wise it would not be able to serve as an effector. 
The functional difference between rational and 
particularistic bureaucracy is that the latter com­
plicates the system by providing an additional 
focus of somewhat unintelligent decision-mak­
ing (for it is not easy to judge on the factors that 
define bureaucratic interests and the motives be­
hind their decisions) which is essentially under 
no one’s control.
(2) The basic function of the independent 
judiciary is conflict resolution. Civil cases are 
in the long run more important socially than 
criminal cases. The courts’ primary task is not 
so much to support a proper behaviour, but to 
secure the proper functioning of the social sys­
tem by resolving conflicts within it. The bulk of 
these conflicts refer to civil suits. When courts 
try more criminal cases than civil ones, some­
thing is wrong with the system; this indicates 
serious dysfunction. A criminal case manifests 
a conflict between a citizen and his/her society, 
not between two citizens. If such conflicts are 
many, the society is in peril.
Another important difference between the 
criminal and civil law lies in the fact that the for­
mer is about norms (as embodied in the crim­
inal code) and deviations, whereas the latter 
is about justice (fairness?). One can, of course, 
speak of punishments as just or unjust, but in 
that case the criterion, and hence the agency, of 
justice is something beyond the society, some­
thing above it -  a transcendent entity that judg­
es on us and distributes prizes and punishments. 
Civil case, however, deals with justice within
the society; and this justice is to be defined by 
the society itself, i.e. in fact by citizens, and not 
by some supersocial power. The obvious conse­
quence is that criminal cases can hardly be tried 
independently of the state, for in actual life it is 
the state that plays the part of the transcendent 
judge, that, in particular, sets and maintains the 
norms. In civil cases, on the contrary, the state is 
generally neutral, for as a rule it has no interest 
and consequently needs to have no part in them. 
One may therefore conclude that the independ­
ence of the judiciary is directly proportional to 
the percentage of civil cases in the total number 
of cases tried in courts.
This conclusion is only strengthened if we 
consider a financial aspect of the matter. Courts 
try civil cases at the litigants’ expense, whereas 
criminal suits are carried on at public expense. 
The more civil cases courts judge on, the more 
independent financially they become. (It goes 
without saying that financial independence is an 
important aspect, if not the basis of independ­
ence in general).
(3) The mass media are basically an informa­
tion network. Knowledge must be disseminated 
if social mind, and the institutions it is embodied 
in, are to function, but it is of vital importance 
how it is disseminated. In particular, it is impor­
tant whether dissemination is effected through a 
centre that can monopolise, and hence control, 
certain kinds of information.
What is significant in this is the fact that 
media are foci that accumulate, sort out and 
disseminate information. Their very existence 
makes transfer of information from one citizen 
to another largely irrelevant: the job is to be done 
anyway. If the free transfer of information and 
absence of barriers or filters between the sourc­
es and the recipients is a democratic ideal, the 
more such foci are on the scene and the farther 
they reach, the better. Ideally, we need many 
long-reaching foci of information, for small cen­
tres are obviously not enough.
History saw dramatic changes in this respect. 
The invention of book-printing resulted in the 
appearance of many and generally long-reaching 
foci of information. The situation was doubtless 
due to the fact that printing-shops were relatively 
cheap. This plurality trend was reversed when ra­
dio and television were invented. Since radio and 
TV studios were expensive, their number was in­
comparable to that of printing-shops and publish­
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ing houses; the result was considerable restriction 
on the free flow of information. It is well known 
that radio helped establish and consolidate the to­
talitarian regimes of the 1930s. The Internet has 
reversed the trend again. Moreover, we are not 
simply back in the book-printing era as it existed 
before radio and television; it may be that we are 
about to enter a totally new era characterised by 
a potentially infinite number of information accu­
mulating and disseminating centres.
Separation of the above institutions, both 
functional and institutional, is at least as impor­
tant as separation of powers. The former must 
be regarded as a founding principle of the same 
rank. If the three functions of our metainstitu­
tions, viz. the innovative, the distributive and 
legislative, are fused together in a single super­
institution, the society will suffer -  basically for 
the same reasons why it suffers when the legis­
lative, the executive and the judiciary are fused 
together, i.e. because of the overlapping of inter­
ests and “crossinfluence”: the powers have to be 
separated precisely in order to prevent second­
ary interests from influencing the decision-mak­
ing where such influence is undesirable.
The above principle has a number of vital 
consequences. It determines in particular the 
inefficiency of economic monopolism that de 
facto fuses the innovative and the distributive 
functions. The impact of monopolisation is well 
known: innovations become to be suppressed. 
That means that “the market of innovations” 
must be institutionally separated from “the mar­
ket of resources”.
The CPSU Central Committee is the classic 
example of a body that sought to combine the in­
novative and legislative functions (in fact, all the 
three major metafunctions, including the dis­
tributive). The result is well known: it has been 
called “stagnation”. And it is after all not that 
important whether it is the distributive function 
that absorbs the rule-setting function or those 
who set rules and monopolise distribution of re­
sources. The choice is between corruption (in the 
former case) and stagnation (in the latter case). 
From this standpoint, our recent transition from 
subduing resources distribution to rigid rules 
of the game to subduing rules to distribution of 
resources is hardly inspiring: we had financial 
institutions that were totally dominated by the 
state apparatus, now we have the state appara­
tus that is totally dominated by financial institu­
tions. Whether the society as a whole has gained 
anything from exchanging stagnation for cor­
ruption remains doubtful.
(A good example of what happens when the 
rules of the game are set by distributing institu­
tions is provided by our recent pawn auctions. 
What is bad is not that banks see their interests 
satisfied -  there is nothing wrong in satisfying 
bankers’ interests. Bad is the situation in which 
bankers themselves set the rules according to 
which their interests are going, in fact have, to 
be satisfied. This is obviously not in the public 
interest.)
Authoritative regimes generally tend to con­
centrate innovations (if these are allowed and 
even if they are proclaimed as the body social’s 
primary goal) and legislation in same hands. 
Hence, the principle of academic freedom as 
something that must be a point of concern not 
for academics alone, but for the society to which 
they belong in general. Any attempt to make sci­
ence serve “ the public interests” is in fact, for all 
its enchantment, an attempt to fuse the innova­
tive and the distributive functions -  usually with 
the most unrewarding consequences for both 
science and economy -  and hence for society in 
general.
An important aspect of this problem is the re­
sponsibility of scientists for the results of their 
research work [4]. If this is demanded and, 
moreover, institutionalised, the legislative and 
innovative functions become inseparable. Just 
as financial independence (freedom of enter­
prise?) is a guarantee against amalgamation of 
the function of innovation and resource distribu­
tion, academic freedom (freedom from responsi­
bility for scientific results) is a guarantee against 
amalgamation of the innovative and the legisla­
tive functions.
What happens when the legislative and the 
economic (distributive) functions are combined 
together is well known from experience. What 
is required here is correct formulation of the 
principle. Combining the two functions leaves 
science alone vis-a-vis the united political/eco­
nomic power and makes scientists -  contrary 
to their intuitive unwillingness and their own 
aspirations -  behave according to the maxim: if 
your society wants you to solve a problem, solve 
it. The result is that science ceases to generate 
innovations and simply lags behind pondering 
problems that are defined by someone else. It
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can no longer provide timely solutions for these 
problems, but is continually busy trying to catch 
up with the life that is far ahead. If there is an­
ything that may be properly called “backward­
ness”, it is this. Gradually but steadily people 
grow accustomed to being always late in solv­
ing their problems -  all despite the ostensibly 
reasonable official slogan of effective and useful 
science.
If science is generally regarded as a means to 
satisfy public needs, public opinion is likely to 
expect it to work miracles, not generate innova­
tions. It thus ceases to be science and turns into 
a kind of magic -  at least, in the public opinion. 
What happens to a miracle worker who fails 
to work the desired miracle is easy to imagine. 
What is important from the standpoint of this 
study is that this attitude destroys the science’s 
institutional structure: those able to fulfil this 
magic function are likely to get all the honours 
and, since no one is in actual life able to fulfil it 
(for magi do not exist, of course, and science is 
no magic), charlatans and scoundrels prosper at 
the expense of genuine and conscientious scien­
tists. At least, they find themselves at the head of 
scientific institutions. In the long run everyone is 
disappointed: science yield neither miracles, nor 
innovations.
Modern Institutions and Modern Mind. As 
a form of conclusion we would like to consider 
the nature of the relation between the institu­
tions in question. That the six basic elements 
of modernity, viz. representative democracy, 
academic science, financial system, rational 
bureaucracy, independent judiciary and free 
media, are in some way related to each other 
is a point of common knowledge. What usually 
escapes attention is the fact that this relation, 
though obvious to the democratic mind, is far 
less obvious to minds shaped in different ways, 
e.g. the authoritarian mind. In other words, if 
the relation exists (and we think we have made 
it clear that in our opinion it does), the knowl­
edge of it is not a priori. It is no gift of “the 
democratic grace” -  something like a natural 
reward of a “politically correct” thinking, no in­
nate democratic idea. A modern mind usually 
possesses this knowledge, but, as we shall try 
to demonstrate, it owes it to experience, and 
there is therefore no reason to believe that this 
kind of knowledge preceded modernity and was 
moreover instrumental in creating it.
Let us consider, for instance, the relation of 
market economy to political democracy1. A  mod­
ern mind easily recognises that the two are in­
terrelated and it seldom hesitates to assert that 
there can be no true market without political 
democracy as there can be no true democracy 
without market economy. Two reasons are usu­
ally given to substantiate this assertion (leaving 
aside the purely empirical argument that demo­
cratic countries are also market economies).
One of the arguments is sociological in nature. 
It emphasises the structural interdependence of 
market institutions and institutions of political 
democracy. It is often argued that only market 
economy can insure citizens sufficient economic 
independence without which they would never 
be anything but the objects of political manipu­
lation and would never become independent po­
litical agents. The argument proceeds from the 
assumption (generally speaking, a correct one) 
that only economically independent agents can 
be politically independent. On the other hand, it 
is widely believed that only democratic institu­
tions can guarantee freedom of economic activ­
ity to masses of citizens, rather than to a limited 
class of economic elite.
Both assertions are, though correct, irrele­
vant. It is true that political independence is a 
sheer illusion if it is not based on economic in­
dependence. But this does not mean a free eco­
nomic agent is necessarily a citizen. On the con­
trary, most economic agents that enjoy freedom 
of market are not individual citizens, they are 
corporations. If corporations are economically 
independent, they are likely to be politically in­
dependent, but a system of politically independ­
ent corporations is not what we call “democra­
cy”. It is conceivable for a society to allow eco­
nomic freedom and political influence that goes 
with it to corporations while denying them to in­
dividuals. Modernity takes it for granted that the 
agents that enjoy economic and political rights 
and freedoms (including freedom of the press
1 See, for example, discussion initiated by Mohamed Ben- 
merikhi “Can democracy function without a free market 
economy, and vice versa?” URL: http://www.researchgate. 
net/post/Can_democracy_function_without_a_free_mar- 
ket_economy_and_vice_versa ; as well as Kurt Bayer’s 
blog “Does Market Economy require Democracy?” URL: 
https://kurtbayer.wordpress.com/2010/04/06/does-mar- 
ket-economy-require-democracy/ (date of access: Febru­
ary 10, 2015).
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and the right for legal protection) are individu­
al human beings. But like everything that is said 
about human rights, this is simply an assump­
tion and, frankly speaking, a surprising one. One 
may wonder, indeed, why the founding fathers 
of modernity never considered alternatives!
On the other hand, it is not exactly true that 
political democracy guarantees equal economic 
rights to all or, at least, to most citizens. Even if 
it is true, as, indeed, it seems to be, that there is 
no other way to secure economic freedom to the 
rank and file except through democratic insti­
tutions, it does not mean that these institutions 
actually fulfil the task. In fact, they do not. What 
they do (and one has to admit this is a job that 
is important enough) is to minimise the risks of 
economic inequalities, to prevent the resulting 
conflicts from destroying the society.
Another argument offered to prove that de­
mocracy and market always go together is psy­
chological or, rather, socio-psychological. It is 
believed that the democratic mind is also a mar­
ket-oriented mind and vice versa.
When combined together, the two arguments 
appear to amount to a plausible explanation of 
the interdependence between market and de­
mocracy. However, the explanation is not flaw­
less because, though compatible, the arguments 
are logically independent. That means that the 
explanation is valid only if both conditions are 
fulfilled, i.e. if the democratic and market insti­
tutions cannot actually exist without each other’s 
support and people know about this and base 
their efforts on this knowledge.
However, it is not easy to explain how the two 
conditions happen to be simultaneously satis­
fied. The first, sociological, argument is a classic 
a posteriori argument. In other words, people 
may come to believe it after they have learnt it 
from experience. They cannot be expected to be­
lieve it from the very beginning.
The second argument seems to be an a priori 
argument, but is in fact not. Or, to be more precise, 
it operates like an a priori argument only within 
a particular social ontology. Modernity supports 
the appropriate social ontology, and a democratic 
mind readily infers democracy from market and 
market from democracy. But if we assume, and 
it is not easy to see how one can avoid assuming 
this, at least, when we refer to the dawn of moder­
nity, that not every mind is ipso facto a democratic 
mind, the link between market and democracy is
no longer self-evident. Is there any reason to be­
lieve that market skills always go with democratic 
beliefs or, at least, eventually produce them? Is a 
person of non-democratic convictions necessarily a 
bad businessman? On the other hand, does a dem­
ocratically-minded person have to believe in the 
efficacy of market? Are there no critics of market 
that not only profess democratic beliefs, but base 
their criticism of market on them? Is there nothing 
to be said against market from the standpoint of 
pure democracy? What about economic inequality 
that no market has yet succeeded to overcome? Or 
is economic inequality irrelevant when it comes to 
political equality? Or is the latter irrelevant when it 
comes to democracy? Democracy can likewise be 
criticised from the standpoint of economic efficien­
cy and, indeed, is often criticised.
We are in a vicious circle: in order to organise 
a society that would meet both conditions, i.e. be 
based on market economy and be democratically 
governed, people must understand that market 
economy and democracy always go together. But 
in order to understand this, they must either live 
for a while in a market-based democratic society 
and learn from experience that this is indeed so, 
or else be born in such a society and be brought 
up in that creed.
The same stands true for science and democ­
racy. A dynamic science does indeed have some 
democratic features, but there is no reason to be­
lieve that scientific, less so educated, mind is nec­
essarily a democratic mind or, for that matter, that 
an uneducated mind is necessarily an undemocrat­
ic mind. It would not be difficult to name notable 
critics of democracy of great intellect and knowl­
edge (Heraclitus or Plato, for example). But even 
if we disregard these persons as sad exceptions, it 
cannot be denied that science, while requiring free­
dom, does not require equality. Whether we like it 
or not, science is elitist in nature. That equality and 
freedom are not easily married is true, but it is also 
true that democracy is not easily defined without 
reference to both (though, it seems, one can do 
without “fraternity”).
On the sociological level, therefore, we have 
no reason to assert that there exists a cause- 
and-effect relationship between the various 
elements of modernity, that market economy, 
for example, results in democracy or vice versa. 
What we can assert on the basis of experience 
is that market and democracy coexist, not that 
they generate each other. If they do it, they only
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do it through people who consciously work on 
it. The cause-and-effect relationship presup­
poses socio-psychological “mediation”: people 
must believe that democracy requires market 
and/or market requires democracy. If this be­
lief is absent, the cause-and-effect relationship 
is doubtful. The belief is not absent, it may be 
argued. It is not in the modern market-based 
democratic society, because modern society 
goes to great lengths to bring its citizens up in 
this belief. But what about societies that have 
not been modernised? Would the explanation 
be of any avail in their cases?
This study seeks to substantiate the thesis that 
coexistence of market and democracy (as well as 
of all other basic elements of modernity) is due 
to mutual support, not to mutual generation. 
Market cannot regulate distribution of resources 
properly, unless it is supported by representative 
democracy, academic science etc. It thus either 
proves ineffective and is, consequently, discard­
ed in favour of alternative economic mecha­
nisms, or continues in some other capacity. In 
both cases it does not produce modernity.
The same stands true for democracy: unsup­
ported by market economy and academic science, 
it breeds nothing but anarchy and is willy-nilly 
discarded for the sake of survival. Without de­
mocracy and market, science does not generate 
innovations or can find no use for them and re­
mains a job for leisurely amateurs, i.e. a marginal 
activity. Unless supervised by democratic institu­
tions, rational bureaucracy is corrupted and loses 
its definitive rational character, degenerating into 
particularistic bureaucracy etc. In other words, 
when isolated, the basic institutions of modernity 
either disappear or are transformed beyond rec­
ognition. This is why they must go together. This 
truth can be learnt, as any other truth can, and 
learning it facilitates modernisation. But there is 
no reason to believe that modernisation can be 
effected by introducing isolated institutions of 
modernity and then waiting for them to produce 
all other necessary institutions. It can hardly be 
effected even if all the basic institutions are repro­
duced, because, although vital, their self-support 
is by no mean spontaneous. It must be secured -  
ideologically, but mainly institutionally.
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